My Approach to Teaching Philosophy
There aren't many uncontroversial metaphilosophical theses, but I think most would agree that philosophy is not a spectator sport; the only way to really learn philosophy is to do it yourself. As a teacher of philosophy, my basic aim is to foster genuine philosophical engagement, such that students don't simply learn about philosophy but to really do it themselves. I see this engagement as coming in a few key forms. First, I aim to provide my students with the confidence to critically engage with primary texts through their written assignments, entering into dialogue with the various philosophers we are reading. Second, I work to create inclusive environment where they can productively engage in philosophical conversation with one another. Finally, I am sure to open myself up to my students as someone with whom they can engage; I make myself accessible to them at every stage of the process of thinking or writing about philosophical issues, giving support and guidance while always encouraging them to exercise their own intellectual freedom.
Courses Taught
Consciousness and Language (Spring 2020, University of Chicago): Contemporary philosophers of mind often speak of the “phenomenal character” of different sorts of conscious experiences. This phrase is meant to express “what it’s like” to have an experience of a particular sort. For instance, when you see something red—a tomato, say—there’s something that it’s like to have an experience of the sort that you’re having. Someone who is color blind from birth might know a lot of things about how color vision works, but they won’t know what it’s like to see something red; that is, they won’t know what the phenomenal character of an experience of seeing something red is.
In this class, we will explore both a negative and a positive thesis about the relationship between this aspect of conscious experience and language. We will start by considering the negative thesis that the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is really “ineffable”—it cannot be expressed in public language. We will consider strategies for trying to make sense of this idea as well as arguments, both belonging to and influenced by Ludwig Wittgenstein, to the effect that there is no way to make sense of it. We will then turn to a corresponding positive thesis that we cannot make sense of phenomenal character of conscious experiences apart from its expression in public language, focusing particularly on the development of this thesis by Wilfrid Sellars and those influenced by him in various ways. In addition to Wittgenstein and Sellars, readings will be from contemporary philosophers including, among others, Frank Jackson, Thomas Nagel, David Chalmers, Paul Horwich, Daniel Dennett, John McDowell, Susanna Schellenberg, Robert Brandom, David Rosenthall, and Paul Churchland.
Courses Assisted
Philosophy of Religion, with Ben Callard (Winter 2021, University of Chicago)
Elementary Logic, with Michael Kremer (Winter 2021, University of Chicago)
Forms of Philosophical Skepticism, with James Conant (Spring 2019, University of Chicago)
Consciousness, with David Finkelstein (Fall 2019, University of Chicago)
Cognition, with Jason Bridges and Chris Kennedy (Spring 2018, University of Chicago)
Formal Logic, with Aron Edidin (Fall, 2013, New College of Florida)
Full teaching portfolio available upon request
There aren't many uncontroversial metaphilosophical theses, but I think most would agree that philosophy is not a spectator sport; the only way to really learn philosophy is to do it yourself. As a teacher of philosophy, my basic aim is to foster genuine philosophical engagement, such that students don't simply learn about philosophy but to really do it themselves. I see this engagement as coming in a few key forms. First, I aim to provide my students with the confidence to critically engage with primary texts through their written assignments, entering into dialogue with the various philosophers we are reading. Second, I work to create inclusive environment where they can productively engage in philosophical conversation with one another. Finally, I am sure to open myself up to my students as someone with whom they can engage; I make myself accessible to them at every stage of the process of thinking or writing about philosophical issues, giving support and guidance while always encouraging them to exercise their own intellectual freedom.
Courses Taught
Consciousness and Language (Spring 2020, University of Chicago): Contemporary philosophers of mind often speak of the “phenomenal character” of different sorts of conscious experiences. This phrase is meant to express “what it’s like” to have an experience of a particular sort. For instance, when you see something red—a tomato, say—there’s something that it’s like to have an experience of the sort that you’re having. Someone who is color blind from birth might know a lot of things about how color vision works, but they won’t know what it’s like to see something red; that is, they won’t know what the phenomenal character of an experience of seeing something red is.
In this class, we will explore both a negative and a positive thesis about the relationship between this aspect of conscious experience and language. We will start by considering the negative thesis that the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is really “ineffable”—it cannot be expressed in public language. We will consider strategies for trying to make sense of this idea as well as arguments, both belonging to and influenced by Ludwig Wittgenstein, to the effect that there is no way to make sense of it. We will then turn to a corresponding positive thesis that we cannot make sense of phenomenal character of conscious experiences apart from its expression in public language, focusing particularly on the development of this thesis by Wilfrid Sellars and those influenced by him in various ways. In addition to Wittgenstein and Sellars, readings will be from contemporary philosophers including, among others, Frank Jackson, Thomas Nagel, David Chalmers, Paul Horwich, Daniel Dennett, John McDowell, Susanna Schellenberg, Robert Brandom, David Rosenthall, and Paul Churchland.
Courses Assisted
Philosophy of Religion, with Ben Callard (Winter 2021, University of Chicago)
Elementary Logic, with Michael Kremer (Winter 2021, University of Chicago)
Forms of Philosophical Skepticism, with James Conant (Spring 2019, University of Chicago)
Consciousness, with David Finkelstein (Fall 2019, University of Chicago)
Cognition, with Jason Bridges and Chris Kennedy (Spring 2018, University of Chicago)
Formal Logic, with Aron Edidin (Fall, 2013, New College of Florida)
Full teaching portfolio available upon request