My Research Program
We might say that Mars is a sphere or say of Mars that it's red. Such italicized phrases denote conceptual and semantic contents: the sorts of things we think or say, or think or say about things. Such things are often referred to, in more mentalistic vocabulary, as ``thoughts" or ``concepts,'' in more linguistic vocabulary, as ``meanings'' (of sentences or predicates), or, in more metaphysical vocabulary, as ``propositions'' or ``properties.'' However one opts to characterize them, my work aims to provide an account of such contents in terms of the norms governing the use of linguistic expressions, and, correspondingly, of our grasp of these contents in terms of our mastery of these norms. My work has two main branches. The first branch involves arguing that account of this sort has far-reaching philosophical consequences, yielding solutions to a whole host of traditional metaphysical and epistemological problems. The second branch involves spelling out such an account in formal detail and developing new formal tools towards that end. Though my work primarily aims to move contemporary philosophy forward, I see my project as historically grounded, and so I also have interests developing certain threads in the history of philosophy that influence my work, especially Wilfrid Sellars and the Madhyamaka tradition in Buddhist philosophy.
Here, you'll find all of my papers (published and unpublished), drafts of book chapters, my dissertation, and some talks I've given. For a guide to how these papers fit together, you can take a look at my research statement (last updated, November 2025). If you have any questions about anything, feel free to send me an email!
We might say that Mars is a sphere or say of Mars that it's red. Such italicized phrases denote conceptual and semantic contents: the sorts of things we think or say, or think or say about things. Such things are often referred to, in more mentalistic vocabulary, as ``thoughts" or ``concepts,'' in more linguistic vocabulary, as ``meanings'' (of sentences or predicates), or, in more metaphysical vocabulary, as ``propositions'' or ``properties.'' However one opts to characterize them, my work aims to provide an account of such contents in terms of the norms governing the use of linguistic expressions, and, correspondingly, of our grasp of these contents in terms of our mastery of these norms. My work has two main branches. The first branch involves arguing that account of this sort has far-reaching philosophical consequences, yielding solutions to a whole host of traditional metaphysical and epistemological problems. The second branch involves spelling out such an account in formal detail and developing new formal tools towards that end. Though my work primarily aims to move contemporary philosophy forward, I see my project as historically grounded, and so I also have interests developing certain threads in the history of philosophy that influence my work, especially Wilfrid Sellars and the Madhyamaka tradition in Buddhist philosophy.
Here, you'll find all of my papers (published and unpublished), drafts of book chapters, my dissertation, and some talks I've given. For a guide to how these papers fit together, you can take a look at my research statement (last updated, November 2025). If you have any questions about anything, feel free to send me an email!
Main Journal Articles:
"Yes," "No," Neither, and Both. Synthese. Forthcoming.
In bilateral logic, affirmation and denial are almost always taken to be exhaustive and exclusive: for any sentence, exactly one of these two opposite stances must be correct. What if, however, we relax this imposition of exhaustivity and exclusivity, or drop it entirely? In this paper I show how, if we do, we arrive at bilateral systems of the FDE family of logics (LP, K3, and FDE), and I show that these systems have philosophical consequences for the debate between "subclassical" and "substructural" approaches to paradoxes like the liar. pdf of penultimate draft
Bringing Bilateralisms Together: A Unified Framework for Inferentialists. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Forthcoming
This paper brings together much of the technical work that I've with the ROLE working group. In it, I consider two distinct versions of "logical bilateralism," which take assertion and denial to be equally basic in providing an account of the logical connectives. I argue that each has benefits when it comes to inferentialist semantics, and I put forward a new kind of logical system that enables us to have the benefits of both. (pdf of penultimate draft)
An Act-Based Approach to Assertibles and Instantiables. Ergo. Forthcoming.
An "act-based" theory of propositions identifies propositions with types of cognitive or linguistic acts. Existing approaches, however, appeal to properties and relations to make sense of these acts, raising many of the same problems that this sort of theory of propositions is meant to solve. In this paper, I show how, by adopting a normative functionalist theory of content of the sort developed by Robert Brandom, we can arrive an act-based conception of propositions and propositional components, without any appeal to properties and relations. (pdf of penultimate draft)
A General Schema for Bilateral Proof Rules. Journal of Philosophical Logic. 2024.
A standard "unilateral" logical system provides rules for inferring sentences from other sentences. A bilateral system, by contrast, provides rules for inferring both affirmations and denials of sentences from other affirmations and denials. In this paper, I put forward a new sort of bilateral proof system in which all the rules for the classical connectives are determined by a single rule schema. I also prove some things about it, illustrating a new method of simplifying proof-theory by doing it at this schematic level of generality. (link to publication, pdf of penultimate draft)
How to Be a Hyper-Inferentialist. Synthese. 2023.
An inferentialist theory of meaning aims to account for the meanings of sentences in terms of the inferential rules governing their use. A "hyper-inferentialist" theory admits only "narrowly inferential" rules, relating sentences to other sentences. Such a version of inferentialism is widely thought to be a theoretical non-starter. I argue here, however, that not only is hyper-inferentialism theoretically viable, but it is really the only viable form of inferentialism there is. (link to publication, pdf of penultimate draft).
Why Must Incompatibility Be Symmetric? The Philosophical Quarterly. 2023.
Something's being red (all over) is incompatible with its being blue (all over), and just as well, something's being blue is incompatible with its being red. In general, it seems that whenever a is incompatible with b, b is also incompatible with a. Why is this the case? This question might not seem like the sort of question we'd be able to answer, and recent work in the philosophy of logic which appeals to the notion of incompatibility as primitive has assumed just that. In this paper, however, I provide an answer. (link to publication, pdf of penultimate draft)
Considering the Exceptions: On the Failure of Cumulative Transitivity for Indicative Conditionals. Synthese. 2022.
All existing theories of indicative conditionals have it that, if "If A then B" is true and "If A and B, then C" is true, then "If A, then C" must also be true. Here, I provide a class of counterexamples to this principle. After spelling out how these cases pose a problem to existing theories of conditionals, I propose a new dynamic strict account of conditionals that accommodates them. (link to publication, pdf of penultimate draft)
In Fall 2019, I was a visitor at Pittsburgh, working with Robert Brandom, and I sat in on Brandom's course on Wilfrid Sellars. One of Brandom's main claims in the course was that Sellars's ontological nominalism was unintelligible. I thought there was more to be said for it, so I decided to write this paper, arguing that Sellars's ontological nominalism is not only intelligible but that the theory of conceptual content that Brandom develops is actually just what is needed for us to make proper sense of it. (link to publication, pdf of penultimate draft.)
Edited Volumes:
Expressivism about Logic. Special Issue of Topoi co-edited with Ulf Hlobil. Accepted and in progress.
Logical expressivism is the view that logical statements are to be understood as, in some way, expressive of our norms or attitudes. This view, which promises to resolve longstanding metaphysical questions concerning the nature of logical facts and epistemological questions concerning our knowledge of them, has been developed in different ways in recent years. This volume will bring together new work on logical expressivism by both established proponents and critics of (different versions of) it, as well as upcoming scholars. In addition to a number of invited contributions, there is currently an open call for papers.
Book Chapters, Special Issues, and Conference Proceedings:
Transcendental Linguistics and Picturing. For The Sellarsian Mind C, edited by Jeremy R. Koons. Routledge. Forthcoming.
This is a paper explicating the big-picture of Sellars's philosophy of language, explaining how the various pieces of his conception of language fit together within his overarching ambition to synthesize the Kantian transcendental project with the linguistic turn. pdf of draft
Generalized Bilateral Harmony. The 2023 Logica Yearbook, edited by Igor Sedlár. College Publications. 2025..
Bilateral natural deduction systems for classical logic solve the problem of harmony between the introduction and elimination rules but give rise to a further problem of potential disharmony between the positive and negative rules. In this paper, I propose a new criterion of bilateral harmony, framed within a new generalized approach to bilateralism as a whole, developed also in my paper "A General Schema for Bilateral Proof Rules." link to book, pdf of paper
Meaning, Coherence, and Consequence: Rethinking the Philosophical Significance of the Sequent Calculus. For a Festschrift for Michael Kremer.
I wrote this paper for Michael Kremer's retirement conference. In it, I consider the potential of the sequent calculus to provide an inferentialist account of the meanings of the logical connectives. I raise a problem regarding multiple conclusions in the classical sequent calculus, and I resolve it by putting forward a new kind of bilateral sequent calculus. Much of what appears here is presented in more detail in my papers "Bringing Bilateralisms Together" and "A General Schema for Bilateral Proof Rules." pdf
Sellars's Two Worlds. In Reading Kant with Sellars, edited by Luz. C Seiberth and Mahdi Ranaee. Routledge. 2025.
This is a paper for a forthcoming anthology on Sellars and Kant. In it, I situate Sellars's Kantian picture in the context of the debate over "two worlds" vs. "two aspects" readings of transcendental idealism, arguing that Sellars has a two worlds conception of transcendental idealism, but he resolves the problems that traditionally plague such conceptions through his distinctive naturalistic spin on Kant. (link to chapter, pdf of penultimate draft)
The Normative/Agentive Correspondence. Journal of Transcendental Philosophy, special issue: "Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Brandom." 2020.
This paper is my attempt to show how Robert Brandom's account of the mind, articulated in normative vocabulary, and the sort of account developed by Irad Kimhi, Sebastian Roedl, and James Conant, articulated principally in terms of agentive modal vocabulary, can be seen as two sides of the same coin. link to publication open access pdf
Pointing Out the Skeptic's Mistake and Reformulating the Two Aspects of Justification. Florida Philosophical Review. 2014, 2013.
These are two papers I wrote as an undergrad. Both won the Florida Philosophical Association's award for the best undergraduate paper, which meant that I got to present them at the Florida Philosophical Association conference and publish them in the Florida Philosophical Review. They eventually became chapters three and four of my undergrad thesis. In the first, I defend Donald Davidson's transcendental argument against Cartesian skepticism by giving it a Moorean spin, drawing on work by Quill Kukla and Mark Lance. In the second, I develop an account of justification, drawing from W.V.O. Quine's work on observation sentences, where justification has two aspects, one connecting to belief qua state and one connecting to belief qua bearer of content, that fit together like the two sides of a seesaw.
Response Papers:
There is a Logical Negation: "Yes," "No," Both, Neither. Australasian Journal of Logic. Forthcoming.
Jc Beall argues that if FDE is logic proper, then there is no logical negation. In this paper, I show that, if we adopt a bilateral approach to FDE (and other subclassical logics) then we can maintain that there is a logical negation, and it's function is just that of classical negation: flipping and flopping between assertion and denial. pdf of penultimate draft, video recording of talk
Supposition: No Problem for Bilateralism. Bulletin of the Section of Logic. 2025.
Nils Kürbis argues that there is no way to make sense of the appeal to supposition in bilateral systems of logic. In this paper, I respond to this objection, first, articulating an interpretation of these systems in which supposition makes perfect sense, and, second, showing how supposition can be done away with entirely. like to paper, open access pdf
Book Reviews:
Review of Belief, Inference, and the Self-Conscious Mind by Eric Marcus. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. 2025.
Eric Marcus has written a really interesting book about the nature of belief and inference. While I think there is a lot that is right in the book, I take issue here with one of Marcus's orienting claims: that it is metaphysically impossible to believe both some proposition and its negation. It seems to me that lots of philosophers and logicians do just that (and, in some of my work, I've developed logics that enable one to self-consciously do it). link to review
Papers Under Review:
The Consequentiality of Explicitation
The notion of committive consequence---that asserting some sentences might commit one to others---is a core semantic notion in the two most prominent alternatives to truth-conditional semantics: dynamic semantics and proof-theoretic semantics. In both traditions, however, it's assuming that making commitments explicit---actually asserting things to which previously was only committed---does not result in one's taking on new implicit commitments. In this paper, I argue, from three different cases, that explicitation is at least sometimes consequential in this way, and I put forward a formal framework drawing from both the dynamic and proof-theoretic tradition that illuminates this phenomenon. pdf of draft, addendum (cut from the paper for reasons for space)
In Defense of Immodesty
John McDowell argues that our semantic aspirations ought to be "modest" ones; we should not try to give an account of the concepts expressed by the primitive expressions of a language. By this definition, inferentialism of the sort developed by Sellars and Brandom is an immodest theory of meaning, aiming to give such an account. In this paper, I defend inferentialism from McDowell's criticisms. pdf of draft
Implication Space Semantics as Bilateral Incompatibility Semantics
Robert Brandom has described the "implication space" semantics, first put forward in Daniel Kaplan's dissertation, as the "holy grail" of inferentialist semantics, the thing that "inferentialists have always dreamed of." However, when one tries to work through the details of the semantic framework, it is very hard to understand what the semantic clauses actually say. In this paper, I articulate implication space semantics as a bilateral successor to Brandom's earlier "incompatibility semantics." pdf of draft
Nominalism as Conceptual Phenomenalism: A Clarification and Defense of a Reading of Sellars Revise and Resubmit at the Journal of Contemporary Chinese Philosophy.
In a number of papers, I've defended (what has been termed by Brandom) a "conceptual phenomenalist" reading of Sellars, according to which conceptual contents such as properties, relations, and propositions are taken to be merely phenomenal entities, contrasted with the world as it is in itself, which contains only particulars. Chen Liang argues that this view rests on some fundamental misunderstandings of Sellars. In this paper, I clarify the view and defend it in response to Liang's criticisms. pdf of paper (note: I weirdly refer to myself in third person for the purpose of blind review)
Papers In the Works:
Sellars's Hyper-Inferentialism
In my paper "How to be a Hyper-Inferentialist," I ague that Brandom is a hyper-inferentialist, understanding meaning entirely in terms of "narrowly" inferential relations between sentences and other sentences. In this paper, I argue that Sellars holds this position as well. slides, audio recording of (short) talk, (draft coming soon)
Against Conceptual Svabhāva
According to the Madhyamaka tradition in Indian Buddhist Philosophy, all things are empty of "svabhāva," a term generally translated as "inherent existence" or "own-being." One of the basic arguments meant to establish this claim is an argument against the coherence of inherently existing things standing in causal relations. In this paper, I reconstruct an important objection against this view (put forward in Nagarjuna's Vigrahavyāvartanī) according to which an argument of just the same form can be applied to the thesis of emptiness itself standing in inferential relations to other theses (for instance, ruling out the claim that things have svabhāva). I argue that the Madhyamika should accept this conclusion, and I articulate an account of conceptual emptiness in response. (presented at UChicago Philosophy of Religions Workshop May 2024, long handout, audio recording of talk)
Properties without Problems
Our ordinary ways of talking and speaking seem to commit us to the claim that there are many different ways things are, and many ways that things could be but nothing actually is. In other words, it seems that there are many properties things have, and many uninstantiated properties that nothing has. There's no existing theory of this vast number of properties, however, that avoids the traditional metaphysical and epistemological problems associated with such things. In this paper, provide an account of properties that resolves these problems. On this account, which is metaphysically platonist but epistemologically nomianlist, properties are modal profiles that things might (or might not) have, and we know about them by mastering the rules governing the use of predicates. pdf of draft (though currently undergoing substantial revisions), video recording of talk
Pragmatic Accounts of Consequence with Luca Incurvati
Pragmatic theories of consequence, which understand logical or semantic consequence in terms of pragmatic notions such as commitment are widely thought to face devastating collapse arguments, showing for instance, that it's a consequence of every proposition that we're committed to it. In this paper, we respond to these arguments, drawing on recent work in bilateral logic.
Sapience without Sentience: An Inferentialist Approach to LLMs
The question of whether LLMs such as ChatGPT "understand what they're saying" has been hotly debated in the AI sphere, though it's rarely clear among participants in these debates just what is meant by this phrase. In this paper, I approach the question of whether LLMs "understand what they're saying" from the perspective of an inferentialist theory of semantic understanding, according to which grasping the meaning of an expression is mastering the inferential rules governing its use. I argue that, on this approach LLMs plausibly do understand what they're saying, and even understand the meaning of essentially experiential terms like "red" and "guilt," but that this doesn't entail that they have experiences of redness or guilt (they clearly don't). That is, I argue that they can be sapient, in the sense of possessing conceptual understanding, without being sentient, possessing conscious awareness. 9/11/25 video recording (paper draft coming soon!)
Sellars's Adverbialism about Content for Act-Based Propositions Throughout the History of Philosophy (special issue of Philosophical Topics), edited by Till Hoeppner.
Sellars is widely cited as an adverbialialist about sensory content, understanding the content of sensory states in terms of adverbial modifiers of the verb "to sense" (speaking, for instance, of a state of "sensing redly"). In this paper, I argue that he is an adverbialist about content generally, including propositional content, and his position can be seen as an early and sophisticated version of an "act-based theory of propositional content."
Book Projects In the Works:
Linguistically Turned
What makes us unique among creatures on Earth? This book articulates an account of ourselves as the sole possessors of thoughts with determinate conceptual contents in terms of our capacity to engage in rational discourse. Chapter 1 draft
Articulating Meanings: An Inferentialist, Proof-Theoretic Approach
In the past few decades, there has been substantial technical work using the tools of formal logic to rigorously development an inferentialist or proof-theoretic approach to meaning. This is a textbook introducing the core formal tools for pursuing this approach to meaning (some familiar to logicians and some new to this work), so as to enable one to do inferentialist semantics oneself. Chapter 1 draft (more chapter drafts coming soon!)
Theses:
Meaning and the World. Ph.D. dissertation. University of Chicago. 2022.
I defended my University of Chicago Ph.D. dissertation in Summer, 2022. My committee consisted of Michael Kremer and Malte Willer as co-chairs, Robert Brandom, Jim Conant, and Jason Bridges. In it, I argue that standard approaches to semantic theorizing, insofar as they aspire to genuine explanations of semantic competence, face a basic problem of explanatory circularity: they are committed to appealing to certain sorts of metaphysical knowledge in accounting for speakers' knowledge of meaning that can really only be understood as a product of speakers' knowledge of meaning. In response, I develop a use-based semantic theory that enables us to account for the metaphysical knowledge of speakers in terms of their mastery of the rules governing the use of linguistic expressions. pdf of dissertation
Common Ground and Discursive Justification (Undergraduate thesis, New College of Florida, 2014)
My undergraduate thesis at New College of Florida was an attempt to draw on the work of Brandom, Davidson, and Kukla and Lance to argue that traditional epistemological questions about the justification of our beliefs could be answered by looking at how we actually justify our beliefs in our practices of discourse. Obviously, I was very young writing this, and I would write it very differently were I to write it now, but, if you're curious, here it is,
Unpublished Manuscripts and Talks:
Do LLMs Make Assertions? (talk, 2025）
In my talk Sapience without Sentience I argue that LLMs can in principle be counted as understanding what they're saying. In this talk, I address the more fundamental question of whether they can really even be counted as saying anything at all. The dilemma that is that, on the one hand, it seems like they do say things, but, on the other hand, saying things--making assertions--seems to require taking on a sort of responsibility for what one says, and it seems that LLMs are in principle incapable of bearing any sort of responsibility. In response to this dilemma, I distinguish between practical responsibility for what one does and theoretical responsibility for what one says, and argue that there is a thin notion of theoretical responsibility that can be attributed to current LLMs which is sufficient to regard them as making assertions (albeit ones that don't have the practical weight of our own). recording of talk, slides
Asserting, Denying, Challenging: A Framework and a Puzzle (talk, 2025）
This talk, which I presented at the fifteenth Buenos Aires philosophical logic workshop, introduces a new framework for systems of bilateral logic that, in addition to distinguishing between the opposite discursive moves of assertion and denial, explicitly represents the distinction between making a discursive move and challenging a move. Building on my recent work on subclassical bilateral logics that forgo the usual “coordination principles” linking assertion and denial, I show how this framework enables us to formally clarify the positions of proponents of different subclassical and substructural approaches to paradox. Finally, I use the framework to crystallize and strengthen a familiar kind of revenge paradox that confronts all such approaches. slides
The stuff about making and challenging moves and the revenge paradox presented in this talk can be found in the second half of my paper "There is a Logical Negation," but it's presented here in a somewhat different way.
The stuff about making and challenging moves and the revenge paradox presented in this talk can be found in the second half of my paper "There is a Logical Negation," but it's presented here in a somewhat different way.
Semantic Norms and their Worldly Correspondents (unpublished m.s./talk, 2024）
This is a paper I presented at the Beijing International Conference on the Philosophy of Normativity. In it, I show how modal normativism can be combined with a kind of modal realism in a way that avoids both skepticism and idealism. pdf (note: this is really just an abridged and repackaged version of Chapter 6 of my dissertation, so please cite that if you want to cite the ideas here)
Sapience without Sentience: An Inferentialist Approach to LLMs (talk, 2024, 2025, hopefully a paper soon)
This talk draws on the ideas from my paper "How to Be a Hyper-inferentialist" and considers some of the implications for understanding large language models. In particular, I suggest that, insofar as we can of concept possession entirely in terms of mastery of inferential role, such systems could in principle be sapient, possessing genuine conceptual understanding, without being sentient, having conscious awareness. 9/11/25 video recording, 3/6/25 video recording, 3/17/25 slides, paper draft in progress
Some Thoughts on the General Form of a Linguistic Capacity (talk/unpublished ms., 2024)
This is the manuscript of a talk I wrote for a conference on Jim Conant's volume, The Logical Alien. In it, I draw on Jim's work to try to articulate what it means to do transcendental philosophy post linguistic-turn. I then try to spell out a tension between Kant's approach to transcendental philosophy and Wittgenstein's approach to linguistic philosophy, ultimately (and very speculatively) suggesting a turn to Sellars for a more Kantian approach to transcendental philosophy, post-linguistic turn. pdf of talk
Meanings Done Right: An Act-Based Theory of Linguistic Meaning (talk, 2023)
This talk presents the main idea of presented in "An Act-Based Theory of Assertibles and Instantiables," with some broader philosophical context and motivation, situating the view in response to contemporary act-based approaches but also in response to ideas from Frege, Wittgenstein, and Sellars. (long handout, talk manuscript, link to audio recording)
On the Self-Undoing of Madhyamaka Philosophy (unpublished m.s., 2023)
The 2nd Century Indian Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna is the widely regarded as the most significant Buddhist philosopher after the Buddha himself. The core doctrine of Nāgārjuna's Madhymamaka (``middle way'') philosophy (insofar as there can be said to be a ``core doctrine'' at all) is that of ``emptiness." Nāgārjuna characterizes emptiness as "the expedient to get rid of all views" which, puzzlingly, includes emptiness itself. In this paper, I try to show how this puzzling "self-undoing" of Madhyamaka philosophy works, taking the vast majority of interpretative views as my target. (pdf)
I'm no longer happy with this paper, as it stands. I will rewrite it at some point in the future, but I plan to work on other stuff in Madhyamaka philosophy before that.
I'm no longer happy with this paper, as it stands. I will rewrite it at some point in the future, but I plan to work on other stuff in Madhyamaka philosophy before that.
Simply Substructural Semantics (talk, 2021)
This is a presentation of some of my work with the R.O.L.E. group. The positive view now has been put forward in "Bringing Bilateralisms Together," but here I pitch this view in response to a problem I raise with representationalist semantic theories when it comes to accounting for defeasible implication and incompatibility relations. pdf
Semantics without Contents (unpublished m.s., 2021)
This paper reframes some of the core ideas of my dissertation. In it, raise a worry about the explanatory role that properties and relations play in contemporary semantic theories, and, I propose a radically different way of doing semantics that doesn't involve any appeal to properties, relations, propositions or anything else to serve as the contents of predicates or sentences. According to this semantic theory, which I "discursive role semantics," we think of the meanings of predicates and sentences directly in terms of what one does in uttering them, without appealing to any things one says. (pdf)
I now think this paper tries to do too much in one go, and I no longer agree with some of the framing. The ideas from it are now presented in a number of different papers, most notably, "An Act-Based Approach to Assertibles and Instantiables," "Brining Bilateralisms Together," and "The Consequentiality of Explicitation."
I now think this paper tries to do too much in one go, and I no longer agree with some of the framing. The ideas from it are now presented in a number of different papers, most notably, "An Act-Based Approach to Assertibles and Instantiables," "Brining Bilateralisms Together," and "The Consequentiality of Explicitation."
This is a paper I wrote for a conference on the work of Matt Boyle. In it, I try to defend a conceptualist picture of perceptual experience of the sort proposed by John McDowell against Matt's critique, developing the "agentive conception of perceptual experience" also put forward in my paper "The Normative Agentive Correspondence." pdf
Frege and the Logical Notion of Judgment (unpublished m.s., 2019)
In attempting to familiarize myself with Begriffsschrift notation, I ended up writing this paper. I argue here that there is a tension in Frege's mature philosophy concerning the place of the judgement stroke in his logical notation, but there were seeds of a very different conception of logic in his early writing--what James Conant calls a "Kantian conception of logic"--where the judgment stroke is not at all out of place. (pdf)
This was my "preliminary essay" for my Ph.D. program at University of Chicago. In it, I present a new argument for the act-based conception of propositions, arguing that propositions do not represent things as being certain ways, as is widely taken to be the case; rather, we represent things as being certain ways, and propositions are our acts of doing so. In subsequent work, most notably, "An Act-Based Approach to Assertibles and Instantiables," I've radicalized the basic view put forward here, applying the act-based approach not just to propositions, but properties as well. (pdf)