

Philosophy 24100: Consciousness

Meets: Mondays from 1:30 to 4:20 in SS 107

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Description:

In the first part of the course, we'll be discussing an argument to the effect that, in order for empirical knowledge to be so much as possible (i.e., in order for radical skepticism not to be intellectually obligatory), we must enjoy a particular kind of self-consciousness. In the remainder of the course, we'll be trying to get into view what an adequate account of that sort of self-consciousness might look like.

Reading Schedule:

1. John McDowell, "Criteria, Defeasibility and Knowledge"
2. Duncan Pritchard, *Epistemological Disjunctivism*, pp. 1-4
Crispin Wright, "(Anti)skeptics Simple and Subtle," pp. 341-347
McDowell, "The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument"
3. Udo Thiel *The Early Modern Subject*, pp. 43-54
David Armstrong *Consciousness and Causality*, pp. 105-116; 118-124
Conant, "Two Varieties of Skepticism," pp. 1-19
4. Hamawaki, "Cartesian Skepticism, Kantian Skepticism and Two Conceptions of Self-Consciousness"
James Conant, "Logical Aliens Revisited," pp. 295-307
5. Richard Moran, *Authority and Estrangement*, pp. 55-65; 83-94
First Paper Due?
6. Wittgenstein, PI §§243-308
David Finkelstein, "Expression and Avowal"
7. Stina Bäckström, "A Dilemma for Neo-Expressivism"
Finkelstein, "Making the Unconscious Conscious"
8. John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, book 2, chapter 27 (1694)
9. Joseph Butler, excerpt from *The Analogy of Religion* (1736)
Thomas Reid, excerpts from *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man* (1785)
McDowell "Reductionism and the First Person"
10. May 16: Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* §§666-691, *Zettel* §§1-16
William Child, "Remembering Intentions"
McDowell, "Are Meaning, Understanding, etc. Definite States?"
Final Paper Due